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CASE COMMENTS
Insurance - INDEMNIFICATION - LESSEE'S PERMITTEE WHO WAS UNAU-
THORIZED To DRIVE VEHICLE UNDER LEASE CANNOT BE REQUIRED To
INDEMNIFY LESSOR FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY PERMITTEE'S NEGLIGENCE.
-Roth v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972).
Ira Plax rented a car from Yellow Rent-A-Car. The rental contract
provided that no one other than Plax could operate the car without
Yellow's written consent. Plax, however, allowed Ronald Roth to oper-
ate the car without Yellow's consent. While driving the car Roth
struck two pedestrians, killing one. The surviving victim and the de-
cedent's administrator filed suits against Roth, Plax and Yellow Rent-
A-Car. Roth's liability insurer, State Farm, provided funds for settle-
ments but reserved the right to seek restitution from the other parties'
insurers. The district court of appeal affirmed two summary judgments
of the trial court. One granted Plax's insurer, North River, and Yel-
low's insurer, Old Republic, indemnity against Roth. The second judg-
ment refused State Farm's claim for restitution from the other two
insurers. The court of appeal concluded that a vehicle owner-lessor is
entitled to indemnification from damages caused by the negligence of
a lessee's permittee who was not authorized to drive the vehicle under
the agreement between the owner and lessee.' The Florida Supreme
Court reversed and remanded on the authority of Susco Car Rental
System v. Leonard,2 holding that it is a "necessary legal corollary" to
the Susco decision that the owner is primarily liable for all damages
caused by the permittee's negligence and that the permittee cannot be
required to indemnify the owner under the terms of an agreement be-
tween the owner and lessee.3
The majority in Roth found the principles underlying Roth and
Susco to be basically the same.4 In Susco a lessee rented an automobile,
agreeing not to let other persons drive the vehicle without the lessor's
written consent. The lessee loaned the automobile to an unauthorized
permittee, who negligently collided with another vehicle, causing in-
jury. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that the lessor was liable to
the injured party, saying that the contractual provisions against un-
authorized permittees could not bar the rights of persons injured by
the rented automobile, since the prohibition did not negate the fact
1. Roth v. Cannel, 242 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
2. 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959).
3. 269 So. 2d at 6.
4. id.
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that the vehicle was put on the highway with the lessor's consent.5 On
the basis of Susco the court in Roth found that the unauthorized per-
mittee had the implied consent of the lessor to use the automobile.6
In Susco the owner's implied consent was based on the theory that
the automobile is a dangerous instrumentality7 The dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine abrogates the common law rule that a bailor is not
liable for the torts of his bailee, s and renders the automobile owner
vicariously liable for injuries caused by the negligence of one to whom
he entrusts his automobile for use on the highways.9 The owner is held
to be vicariously liable so as to afford the public some measure of pro-
tection from the dangerous character of the automobile operated on the
highway and to encourage the owner to be selective when permitting
others to drive his automobile. 10 Although the rental car owner is vi-
cariously liable to injured parties, Florida law generally permits the
vicariously liable owner to recover indemnity from the negligent tort-
feasor operator." An exception to this rule arises where the driver has
5. 112 So. 2d at 836.
6. 269 So. 2d at 6.
7. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine was set forth in Fletcher v. Rylands, 1
L.R. 265 (Ex. 1866), afJ'd, 3 L.R. 330 (H.L. 1868). It serves as a means of finding an owner
of a dangerous instrumentality liable for injuries caused by the instrumentality, without
a demonstration that the owner was guilty of negligent conduct. In 1920, Florida applied
this doctrine to the automobile, finding that an automobile operated on the highways
was a dangerous instrumentality. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla.
1920). This doctrine has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See Lynch v. Walker, 31 So. 2d 268
(Fla. 1947); Boggs v. Butler, 176 So. 174 (Fla. 1937).
Florida is the only jurisdiction which has applied the dangerous instrumentality doc-
trine to automobiles. Note, The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine: Unique Automobile
Law in Florida, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 412, 413 (1952). Most states have held that an auto-
mobile is not a dangerous instrumentality, and that liability for the negligent operation
of such a vehicle by one other than the owner cannot be predicated on mere ownership.
See, e.g., Gardiner v. Solomon, 75 So. 621 (Ala. 1917); Hunter v. First State Bank, 28
S.W.2d 712 (Ark. 1930); Slaughter v. Holsomback, 147 So. 318 (Miss. 1933); Vincent v.
Crandall & Godley Co., 115 N.Y.S. 600 (1909); Terrett v. Wray, 105 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn. 1937).
8. See Note, The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine: Unique Automobile Law in
Florida, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1952). For a traditional view of the liability of the auto-
mobile owner, see, e.g., Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 179 P. 697 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1919). The court there found a bailor of an automobile not liable for the injuries to a
third person caused by his bailee, stating:
The liability of an owner of an automobile for the negligence of its driver de-
pends on the existence of the relation of principal and agent between the two.
This relation does not result from the mere borrowing of such automobile. Hence
it is uniformly held that the owner is not responsible for injuries resulting from
the negligence of a driver whose only relation to the owner is that of borrower.
Id. at 698.
9. See Florida cases cited in note 7 supra.
10. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).
11. See Hertz Corp. v. Richards, 224 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Finch-
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paid the owner for insurance protection. 12 In Roth, the rental charge
paid by lessee Plax to Yellow Rent-A-Car included the cost factor of
owner's liability insurance. 3 Thus if Plax had been the tort-feasor, Yel-
low could not have recovered indemnity from him.
1.4
While the lessor would generally not have a cause of action for in-
demnity against a lessee tort-feasor when the lessee had paid for lia-
bility insurance, a lessor would seem to have an action for indemnity
against a permittee tort-feasor, since the permittee would not have
paid the lessor any premium for insurance, and the general rules of
indemnity would apply. This occurred in Hertz Corp. v. Richards; 5
there the court granted the lessor Hertz indemnity from the permittee
tort-feasor. Consequently, in the Roth decision, it would appear that
if the lessor, Yellow Rent-A-Car, had been held vicariously liable to the
injured parties due to the active negligence of the unauthorized per-
mittee, the lessor would have been entitled to indemnity from Roth or
his insurer.
In Roth, however, it was the tort-feasor's insurer, State Farm, who
sought indemnity from the lessor after it had paid settlements to the
injured parties. The district court of appeal denied indemnity to State
ner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Hutchins v.
Frank E. Campbell, Inc., 123 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
This results from the generally accepted rules that one is responsible for the conse-
quences of his own negligence and that one held liable for the negligence of another has
a right of indemnity from that person. See, e.g., Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Transport Ins.
Co., 341 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1965) (applying Arkansas law); Kramer v. Morgan, 85 F.2d 96
(2d Cir. 1936) (dictum); Dale v. Whiteman, 202 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1972); Lunderberg v.
Bierman, 63 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1954); Traub v. Dinzler, 131 N.E.2d 564 (N.Y. 1955);
Millard v. Baker, 81 N.W.2d 892 (S.D. 1957).
12. See Morse Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Lewis, 161 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
In the Morse decision the court left open the possibility of a different result if the judg-
ment exceeded the coverage provided under the agreement. The owner was held entitled
to indemnification from lessee for monies paid in excess of coverage provided in the lease
agreement in Hertz Corp. v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 292 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Fla.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969).
13. 242 So. 2d at 492-93. The court of appeal apparently considered it immaterial
whether the fee for the insurance or even mention of liability insurance is set out in the
rental agreement so long as the rental cost in fact includes the insurance.
14. See Bordettsky v. Hertz Corp., 171 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Morse
Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Lewis, 161 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
15. 224 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In Hertz the lessee rented an auto-
mobile, agreeing not to allow other persons to drive it. Such persons were also specifically
excluded from protection under the owner's automobile liability policy. The lessee per-
mitted another to drive the automobile, and the permittee negligently collided with an-
other vehicle, causing injury. The injured party brought an action against the owner
Hertz, and Hertz filed a third party indemnity action against the permittee. The trial
court granted Hertz indemnity, and the district court affirmed.
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Farm, relying on Hertz for the principle that it is the owner who is
entitled to indemnification from the negligent permittee. 16
In its decision the supreme court made no mention of the Hertz
decision. Although both Hertz and Roth involved the question of
whether the lessor-owner or the actual tort-feasor was to be held ulti-
mately liable, there are factual distinctions between the two cases. In
Roth the owner's policy was certified as proof of financial responsibility
for the future. 17 In Hertz it is not clear whether the liability policy was
so certified.' Thus the presence of an automobile liability policy cer-
tified under the Financial Responsibility Law 9 may be a crucial dis-
tinction between Hertz and Roth.20
Financial responsibility laws have been enacted by nearly every
state.21 The intent of the laws is to ensure that persons injured in auto-
16. 242 So. 2d at 492.
17. 269 So. 2d at 6.
18. "In Hertz the liability policy was not certified as proof of its financial responsi-
bility for the future. Or, if it was, this feature was never considered by the trial or appel-
late courts." Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 14, Roth v. Old Republic Insurance Co.,
269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972).
19. FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1971).
20. Another factual distinction between Hertz and Roth involves the agreement not
to allow third persons to use the car without express permission from the lessor. The
Hertz contract expressly provided that, with certain stated exceptions, the liability in-
surance did not apply when the vehicle was operated by someone other than the lessee.
224 So. 2d at 785. The Yellow Rent-A-Car lease agreement only prohibited use by "any-
one other than the . . . renter without . . . express written consent." 242 So. 2d at 493.
No mention of the consequences was made. The court apparently ignored this contrac-
tual difference. Had this been held to be a crucial distinction the only result would have
been the subsequent insertion of language similar to that employed by Hertz in car
rental agreements by other lessors.
21. The following states have financial responsibility laws: ALA. CODE tit. 36, §§
74 (42)- (83) (1958), as amended, (Supp. 1971); ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.20.010-.640 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. 1973); A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1101 to -1225 (1956), as amended,
(Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-1401 to -1493 (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1971);
CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 16000-560 (West 1971), as amended, (West Supp. 1973); CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-7-1 to -7-39 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-112 to -142 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2901-72
(1953), as amended, (Supp. 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-417 to -498c (1968), as amended,
(Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. §§ 324.011-.251 (1971), as amended, Fla Laws 1973, ch. 73-180,
§§ 2, 5; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-601 to -621 (1972), as amended, (Supp. 1972); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 287-1 to -48 (1968); IDAHO CODE §§ 49-1501 to -1540 (1967), as amended,
(Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , §§ 7-100 to -503 (Smith-Hurd 1971), as amended,
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-2-1-1 to -45 (1973); IOWA CODE. ANN.
§§ 321A.1-.39 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-722 to -769
(1964), as amended, (Supp. 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 187.290-.990 (1971), as amended,
(Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:851 to :1043 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1973);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 781-88 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1972); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 3G (1969) (applies only to nonresident motorists); MICH. COMP.
(Vol. I
CASE COMMENTS
mobile accidents receive compensation and to force irresponsible mo-
torists off the highways.22 There has been a strong indication that fi-
nancial responsibility legislation was not intended to benefit the tort-
feasor of an automobile accident. 23
Financial responsibility laws are generally of two types: "proof"
LAWS ANN. §§ 257.501-.532 (1967, as amended, (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
170.21-.58 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1973); Miss CODE ANN. §§ 63-15-1 to -75 (1972),
as amended, (Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 303.010-.370 (1972), as amended, (Supp.
1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 53-418 to -458 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1973);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-501 to -569 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 485.010-.420 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 268 (1966), as amend-
ed, (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-23 to -104 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§64.24-1 to -107 (1972); N.Y. VEH. & TRAY. LAWS §§ 330-368 (McKinney 1970),
as amended. (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20"279.1-.39 (1965), as
amended, (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 39-16, 39-16.1 (1972), as amended,
(Supp. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 4509 (Page 1965), as amended, (Page Supp.
1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, ch. 7 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. ch. 486 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 1401-36 (1971), as amended, (Supp.
1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 31-31-1 to -22, 31-32-1 to -35 (1968), as amended, (Supp.
1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-701 to -750.28 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1972); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. ch. 32-35 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
59-1201 to -1240 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1973); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h
(1969), as amended, (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-12-1 to -41 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 801-09 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-388 to
-514 (1972), as amended, (Supp. 1973), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 46.29 (1970), as amend-
ed, (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 17D (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1973); Wis.
STAT. ANN. ch. 344 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1973); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-277 to -315
(1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
Additionally, several states have some form of compulsory automobile liability insur-
ance. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66/2, §§ 7-101 to -102 (Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 90, §§ 34A-J (1969), as amended, §§ 34A-O (Supp. 1973), ch. 175, §§ 113A-M (1972),
as amended, (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6B-1 to -2 (1973); N.Y. VEH. &: TRAF.
LAWS §§ 310-321 (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 20-309 to -319 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
Compulsory automobile insurance laws generally require a motor vehicle owner to
have insurance or a substitute form of security at least equal in amount to the statutory
minimum before his automobile can be registered. Under the Florida Automobile Repa-
rations Reform Act, liability insurance became compulsory for every owner or registrant
of a "motor vehicle" required to be licensed in the state. FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1) (1971).
The term "motor vehicle" is defined so as to limit the compulsory coverage to certain
types of vehicles. See FLA. STAT. § 627.732 (1) (1971).
22. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 102-
03 (1965); Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505, 506
(1936); Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 300, 305 (1950); Note, The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, 22 FLA. L.J. 17,
18 (1948); Comment, The Principles of Financial Responsibility for Private Motor Ve-
hicles, 4 MIAMI L.Q. 502 (1950); Note, Legislation-A Survey of Financial Responsibility
Laws and Compensation of Traffic Victims: A Proposal for Reform, 21 VAND. L. REV.
1050, 1051 (1968).
23. Comment, The Principles of Financial Responsibility for Private Motor Vehicles,
4 MIAMI L.Q. 502, 508 (1950). See also Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
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and "security" statutes.2 4 The "proof" statutes were the first financial
responsibility laws. They allow one uninsured accident, after which
the owner is required to show proof of financial responsibility for the
future. This "proof" can be met by securing an automobile liability
insurance policy which provides the statutory amounts of protection.
If proof of financial responsibility is not secured after the first accident,
the driver's license and motor vehicle registration are revoked. "Proof"
statutes, however, do not protect the first victim of a negligent driver.
"Security" statutes were enacted to remedy this situation to some ex-
tent. The "security" statute does not make automobile liability insur-
ance compulsory, but at the time of the first accident the owner must
show proof of security sufficient to satisfy any judgment that might
be rendered against him. Failure to do so will result in the loss of li-
cense and motor vehicle registration. The "security" requirement can
also most easily be met by procuring automobile liability insurance
prior to any accident.25
In Florida one way the "security" requirement may be met is by
furnishing proof of a certified liability policy.26 To qualify under the
Financial Responsibility Law a liability policy must comply with cer-
tain statutory requirements, including requirements as to scope and
amount of coverage. The policy must specify a particular vehicle and
cover the owner and anyone operating that vehicle with either the
express or implied permission of the owner.27 Currently the amounts
of liability coverage required are $10,000 for injury to one person,
$20,000 for injury to two or more persons and $5,000 for property
damage .2 The certified policy may not contain provisions which lessen
or are contrary to the coverage required by the law.29 If a certified pol-
icy contains such provisions, they will be voided, and the insurer will
be required to provide the statutory coverage.2 0
24. Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM.
L. REv. 300, 305 (1950). The following discussion of "proof" and "security" statutes is
based largely upon Grad's discussion, id. at 305-11.
25. Florida's present financial responsibility law is a "proof" and "security" statute
as are those of many other states. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 22, App. C.
26. FLA. STAT. § 324.031 (1) (1971). Financial responsibility can also be proved by
posting a surety bond, by furnishing a certification of a deposit of cash or securities, or
by furnishing a certificate of self-insurance. FLA. STAT. § § 324.031 (2)-(4) (1971).
27. FLA. STAT. § 324.151 (1) (a) (1971).
28. FLA. STAT. § 324.021 (7) (1971). The required amounts of coverage for personal
injury will be increased to $15,000 and $30,000 on July 1, 1975. FLA. LAWS 1973, ch.
73-180, §§ 2, 5.
29 See Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 210 So. 2d 715 (Fla.
1968).
30. Makris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 267 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972).
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Yellow's liability policy, by virtue of certification as proof of finan-
cial responsibility for the future, was required to "insure the owner
named therein and any other person as operator using such motor
vehicle . . .with the express or implied permission of such owner
. .. -31 Since permittee Roth had the owner's implied consent, he
came within the "any other person as operator" protection. The pro-
hibition against unauthorized permittees in the Yellow Rent-A-Car
rental agreement was then voided as contrary to the financial responsi-
bility protection afforded to Roth and injured members of the public. 3 2
Consequently, Yellow's insurer was found liable for the settlements to
the plaintiffs by application of the provisions of the Financial Respon-
sibility Law.
After finding the lessor's insurer initially liable, the court failed
to recognize the lessor's common law right of indemnity.33 Although the
owner-lessor is vicariously liable to those who are injured by his auto-
mobile, previously he was generally allowed to seek indemnity from
the tort-feasor to whom he entrusted his automobile.34 The Roth deci-
sion precludes the owner from a recovery from the permittee tort-
feasor.
The court's decision grants the insurer of an active tort-feasor in-
demnity from the insurer of a vicariously liable owner. In so doing, it
is clearly contrary to the idea that protection afforded by financial re-
sponsibility legislation is intended to benefit injured parties, not tort-
feasors.3 5 Nothing in Florida's Financial Responsibility Law suggests
that it was enacted to protect tort-feasors or their insurers. Further-
more, the court's decision appears to be directly contrary to rulings in
other jurisdictions where indemnity from a tort-feasor has been granted
to an owner, even where the owner was initially held liable under the
provisions of the state's financial responsibility law.3 6
Contrary to the court's implication, the Roth decision does not im-
31. FLA. STAT. § 324.151(l)(a) (1971).
32. 269 So. 2d at 6-7.
33. Id. at 6; see note 11 supra.
34. See note 11 supra.
35. See note 23 supra.
36. See, e.g., Lunderberg v. Bierman, 63 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. 1954):
[W]here the owner of an automobile has become liable to a third person injured
by one to whom the owner has granted permission to drive his car solely by virtue
of the Financial Responsibility Act, such owner is entitled to recover indemnity
from the operator of the car in the absence of any active negligence chargeable to
the owner.
See Kramer v. Morgan, 85 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1936) (dictum); Dale v. Whiteman, 202
N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1972); Traub v. Dinzler, 131 N.E.2d 564 (N.Y. 1955); Millard v. Baker,
81 N.W.2d 892 (S.D. 1957).
1973] 669
Florida State University Law Review [Vol. I
prove the injured party's chances of receiving compensation. Had the
court refused to grant State Farm indemnity, plaintiffs would still have
been able to collect from the vicariously liable owner. The decision
does serve to benefit the unauthorized permittee tort-feasor and his in-
surer. It frees him and his insurer from the cost of his negligence, and
puts the cost on the rental agency and ultimately the public. The re-
sult is an extension of Susco that is unnecessary to carry out the initial
purpose of financial responsibility legislation-compensating injured
victims and making highway travel more safe.
Torts-IMPAcT RULE-DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE FOR PHYSICAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER INJURED
PARTY SUFFERED PHYSICAL IMPACT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE TORT.-
Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972) rev'd,
No. 43,363 (Fla., Jan. 10, 1974).
Two cars driven by the defendants collided. The car driven by
defendant Bradley then struck the Stewart home, and the defendant
Gilliam's car struck a tree in the Stewart yard. Mrs. Stewart, who was in
her house when the Bradley car struck it, ran outside to see if anyone
was hurt. Soon after returning to the house, she felt chest pains. Two
hours later she was placed in the intensive care unit of a nearby hos-
37. The court contended that its ruling would in the long run make recovery easier
for injured third parties:
Often such permittees of rental car lessees temporarily driving rental cars would not
be as fortunate as Roth and have the protection of their own personal auto liability
insurance coverage, rendering it even more difficult for injured members of the
public to recover their losses arising from the negligence of drivers of rental cars.
269 So. 2d at 7.
This reasoning fails because the fact that a permittee tort-feasor might "not be as for-
tunate as Roth and have the protection of . . . liability insurance coverage" is irrelevant
in terms of protecting the public. Protection of injured members of the public requires
only that some source of recovery be made available; Florida law has provided that that
source will be the vicariously liable owner. Once that primary source of recovery has been
supplied, different concerns should govern determination of which insurance company
shall ultimately bear the cost. This was recognized by Justice Dekle in his dissenting
opinion:
Of course there is liability [on the part of the lessor] to the injured party and no
rental contract agreement can prevent it. With that there is complete accord. Here,
however, that question has been settled and the respective insurance companies are
litigating indemnification. ...
